Putin Blocks Peace Talks By Refusing To Meet Zelensky
The Department of Diplomatic Efficiency had been meeting for several years. In that time, they had achieved nothing, but they had produced a comprehensive definition of the word “meeting” that ran to forty-seven pages and was, by universal agreement, the finest piece of prose anyone in the room had ever read. It was a document of such bureaucratic beauty that it made the actual act of talking to the other side seem not just unnecessary, but positively vulgar.
This is the Committee Problem in its purest, most devastating form. It is not that Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky are incapable of communication. It is that the machinery designed to facilitate their communication has evolved, through a series of small, sensible, and entirely logical steps, into a machine designed to prevent it. The system was not broken; it was working exactly as designed. This was the problem.
Consider the process by which a war is ended. In theory, it involves two leaders sitting down, exchanging views, and perhaps signing a piece of paper. In practice, it involves a committee of advisors, each of whom is individually intelligent, well-meaning, and deeply concerned with the preservation of their own institutional relevance. The advisor to the President is optimising for the preservation of the President’s authority. The advisor to the Prime Minister is optimising for the preservation of national dignity. The military attaché is optimising for the preservation of strategic advantage. The press secretary is optimising for the preservation of a coherent narrative.
None of these individuals is stupid. Indeed, they are likely very clever. But when you put them in a room together, they do not produce a peace treaty. They produce a stalemate. This is because the committee is not designed to solve the problem; it is designed to manage the anxiety of the people in the room. The output of the committee is not a decision; it is a deferral. And deferral is a very comfortable place to be. It requires no courage, no risk, and no admission that the previous strategy was a mistake.
So, when Mr. Putin states there is “no point” in meeting with Mr. Zelensky, he is not expressing a personal whim. He is reciting the official position of the Department of Diplomatic Efficiency. The statement is technically accurate. There is, indeed, no point in meeting, because the meeting has already been held. It was held in the corridors of power, in the briefing rooms, in the late-night phone calls between aides who are too junior to be held accountable and too senior to be ignored. The meeting has been held so many times, in so many different formats, with so many different caveats and pre-conditions, that the actual physical presence of the two leaders would add nothing but awkwardness.
The tragedy, of course, is that the people suffering the consequences of this process are not in the room. They are not optimising for institutional relevance. They are optimising for survival. And from their perspective, the committee’s output looks less like a diplomatic strategy and more like a elaborate game of musical chairs where the music never stops and the chairs are on fire.
This is the evolution of unhelpfulness. At some point, the process of diplomacy stopped serving the purpose of ending wars and started serving the purpose of justifying the continuation of them. The forms were filled out. The protocols were observed. The language was precise. The outcome was catastrophic. But the process was impeccable.
One might argue that this is a failure of leadership. But leadership is just another committee, and it suffers from the same disease. The leader is surrounded by people who tell him what he wants to hear, because those are the people who remain in the room. The dissenting voices are filtered out, not by malice, but by the natural selection of bureaucratic survival. The result is a leader who believes, with absolute sincerity, that there is no point in talking, because everyone he has spoken to has confirmed that there is no point in talking.
The information was technically available to him. That is the cruelest part. The fact that the other side was willing to talk was known. The fact that the people on the ground were suffering was known. The fact that the war was costing more than it was gaining was known. But the process did not allow for the integration of this information. The process required that the information be processed, filed, reviewed, and then discarded, because it did not fit into the existing framework of the committee’s self-justification.
So we are left with a stalemate that is not a stalemate of wills, but a stalemate of procedure. The war continues not because peace is impossible, but because peace is administratively inconvenient. It requires a change in the narrative. It requires an admission that the previous calculations were wrong. It requires the committee to stop managing its own anxiety and start managing the reality of the situation.
And so the ships hang in the sky, not because they are flying, but because the committee has not yet decided whether they should be allowed to land. The bricks do not hang in the sky, but the committee has produced a forty-seven-page report on why they might, under certain conditions, be permitted to do so. The report is beautiful. The bricks are still falling. And the people below are still waiting for the committee to finish reading it.