The EU is moving to reduce dependence on Chinese-made solar technology over concerns it poses security risks, including potential blackouts.
The principle operating here, stated plainly, is: A state may restrict the free exchange of goods and technologies from a foreign power when it judges that such dependence threatens the security of its own infrastructure, even if the threat is speculative rather than demonstrated. Let us ask whether this principle, universalised, produces coherence or contradiction.
To evaluate this, we must first isolate the maxim from the noise of political expediency. The European Commission does not claim that Chinese solar panels are inherently evil, nor does it claim that Chinese manufacturers are acting in bad faith. Rather, the action is predicated on a calculation of risk. The implicit rule is that a sovereign entity has the right to prioritize its own stability over the universal freedom of trade when it perceives a vulnerability in its supply chain. If we universalize this, we arrive at a world where every nation, at every moment of perceived insecurity, erects barriers against its neighbors. The result is not a community of rational agents, but a fragmented archipelago of isolated fortresses, each claiming the right to sever ties whenever fear outweighs trust. Such a world is not incoherent in the logical sense - it is perfectly consistent with human nature - but it is incoherent with the idea of a cosmopolitan order governed by law rather than by the fluctuating tides of suspicion.
However, we must look deeper than the mere mechanics of trade. The core of the matter lies in the treatment of persons and institutions as ends in themselves. The Humanity Formula demands that we never treat humanity, whether in our own person or in that of another, merely as a means. When the EU moves to decouple from Chinese technology based on the possibility of a security breach, it is treating the Chinese manufacturers, and by extension the Chinese state, as a potential instrument of harm rather than as a partner in a shared global economy. It is a preemptive judgment. It assumes guilt before the crime is committed. This is a violation of the dignity of the other, reducing a complex economic actor to a single variable of risk.
Yet, we must also consider the duty to the citizens of Europe. The state has a duty to protect the safety and well-being of its people. If the grid is vulnerable to blackout, and if that vulnerability stems from a lack of oversight or inherent design flaws in the imported technology, then the state has a duty to act. The question is not whether the state should act, but on what principle it acts. If it acts on the principle of “security through isolation,” it abandons the moral law for the law of the jungle. If it acts on the principle of “security through rigorous, transparent, and universal standards,” it remains within the bounds of duty.
The danger in the current approach is that it substitutes calculation for principle. The officials in Brussels are not asking, “Is this action right?” They are asking, “Is this action safe?” This is a consequentialist error. It assumes that the morality of an act is determined by its outcome. But if the outcome is uncertain - as the contested facts suggest, with experts divided on the likelihood of blackouts - then the action rests on a foundation of sand. A moral law must be firm, like the stone of Königsberg, not shifting with the winds of geopolitical anxiety.
Consider the analogy of a bridge. If a bridge is built with materials that are suspected of being weak, the engineer has a duty to inspect it. But if the engineer refuses to let anyone cross the bridge until he is certain it will never collapse, he is not acting on reason; he is acting on fear. Reason demands that we establish standards for construction that are universal and verifiable. If Chinese manufacturers can meet those standards, they should be allowed to participate. If they cannot, they should be excluded. But the exclusion must be based on the failure to meet the standard, not on the nationality of the builder.
The current policy seems to blur this distinction. It treats the origin of the technology as a proxy for its safety. This is a categorical error. It conflates the source with the substance. In doing so, it undermines the very principle of universal law. If we allow nations to discriminate based on origin rather than merit, we create a world where trade is governed by suspicion rather than by reason. This is not a kingdom of ends; it is a kingdom of fears.
Therefore, the duty that follows is clear. The EU must not act on the maxim of preemptive exclusion based on national origin. Instead, it must act on the maxim of rigorous, transparent, and universally applied safety standards. It must treat Chinese manufacturers as ends in themselves, capable of meeting those standards, rather than as means to be controlled. It must distinguish between the legitimate duty to protect the grid and the illegitimate inclination to isolate. The moral worth of the action lies not in the reduction of dependence, but in the adherence to a principle that could be willed by all rational beings: that trade is open to all who meet the universal requirements of safety and integrity, regardless of their origin. Anything less is not policy; it is prejudice dressed in the language of security.