A brief US effort to steer trapped vessels through the Strait of Hormuz strained a fragile ceasefire and raised fears of renewed war.

It is proposed, with the utmost reason, that the United States, having demonstrated such admirable proficiency in the management of maritime logistics, extend its stewardship to the Strait of Hormuz not merely as a guarantor of passage, but as the primary architect of its permanent closure. The committee has calculated the savings, and they are considerable.

We must first acknowledge the prevailing anxiety that has gripped the commercial world since the recent efforts to steer trapped vessels through this narrow channel. It is a distressing spectacle, this fragility of the ceasefire, this trembling of global energy supplies, this sudden fear that war might return to a region we had so comfortably assumed was pacified by the mere presence of our naval assets. The current arrangement, wherein American vessels attempt to escort commercial traffic through a zone of active hostility, is inefficient. It places the burden of risk upon the merchant, the insurer, and the consumer, while offering no guarantee of safety. Indeed, the very act of “reopening” the strait, as it has been termed, suggests a prior state of openness that never truly existed; it was always a chokepoint, a throat waiting to be squeezed. To treat it as a highway is to misunderstand the nature of the terrain.

Therefore, I propose a modest adjustment to our strategic posture. Rather than attempting to force the passage of oil tankers through a gauntlet of potential conflict, we should formalize the blockade. If the Strait of Hormuz is the critical maritime chokepoint that destabilizes the global economy when threatened, then its stabilization requires not the flow of commerce, but the cessation of it. By closing the strait entirely, under the benevolent administration of the United States Navy, we eliminate the variable of surprise. We remove the ambiguity of “freedom of navigation” and replace it with the clarity of “freedom from navigation.”

Consider the economic benefits. The current volatility in oil prices is a source of great distress to the consumer and the investor alike. Prices fluctuate wildly based on rumors of drone strikes, shadow fleets, and diplomatic posturing. This uncertainty is a tax on industry. If the strait were closed, the price of oil would rise, certainly, but it would rise to a fixed, predictable level. The market abhors a vacuum, but it abhors uncertainty more. A closed strait creates a stable, high-price equilibrium. The American consumer, accustomed to the comforts of cheap energy, may initially protest, but he is a rational creature. He will adapt. He will drive less. He will insulate his homes. He will innovate. The shock to the system is merely the growing pain of a more efficient, less dependent economy.

this proposal addresses the moral hazard inherent in the current ceasefire. A ceasefire is a fragile thing, maintained by the mutual exhaustion of combatants and the vague promise of future peace. It is a pause, not a resolution. By closing the strait, we remove the incentive for either side to test the waters. If there is no water to be tested, there is no temptation to dip a toe in. The parties involved, deprived of the ability to project power through maritime dominance, will be forced to return to the negotiating table. Or, failing that, they will be forced to look inward. The closure of the strait acts as a pressure cooker, forcing a resolution that diplomacy, with its endless committees and half-measures, has failed to achieve.

It may be objected that this proposal is harsh, that it punishes the innocent merchant and the neutral observer. To this, I reply that in matters of state security, the distinction between the innocent and the guilty is often a luxury we cannot afford. The merchant who sails through the strait is, by definition, a participant in the conflict. He profits from the trade that fuels the war. To protect him is to subsidize the very instability we seek to cure. the United States has a duty to its own citizens, who suffer from the inflationary pressures caused by energy shocks. Is it not more humane to impose a temporary hardship on the global market than to risk a prolonged war that could cost thousands of lives and trillions of dollars? The arithmetic is clear. The cost of closure is high, but the cost of inaction is higher.

Some may argue that this approach undermines the principle of freedom of the seas. But what is freedom, if not the absence of coercion? The current situation is one of coercion, where vessels are held hostage by the threat of attack. By closing the strait, we remove the threat. We replace the chaos of potential violence with the order of enforced stillness. It is a trade-off, yes, but it is a rational one. We exchange the illusion of safety for the reality of control.

The implementation of this proposal would be straightforward. The United States Navy, already present in the region, would simply expand its perimeter. No new ships need be built; no new troops need be deployed. The existing assets are sufficient. The only requirement is a change in policy, a shift in mindset from protector to warden. This is a small step, but it is a decisive one. It acknowledges the reality of the situation: that the Strait of Hormuz is not a highway, but a battlefield. And on a battlefield, the only safe place is nowhere.

the proposal to close the Strait of Hormuz is not an act of aggression, but an act of preservation. It preserves the ceasefire by removing the means of its violation. It preserves the global economy by stabilizing energy prices. It preserves American interests by reducing our exposure to regional conflict. It is a modest proposal, born of reason and necessity. We have tried the path of openness, and it has led us to the brink of war. Let us now try the path of closure, and see if it leads us to peace. The committee awaits your endorsement.