Five major book publishers and one author filed a class action lawsuit against Meta alleging massive copyright infringement of copyrighted materials.
The principle operating here, stated plainly, is: one may appropriate the intellectual labor of others without consent when the scale of appropriation renders individual resistance impractical and the resulting utility to the appropriator is significant. Let us ask whether this principle, universalised, produces coherence or contradiction.
To evaluate this matter, we must first strip away the technical jargon of “training data” and “transformers.” These are merely the instruments of the action, not the moral substance of it. The substance is the act of taking. The publishers and the author allege that Meta has taken their works - their words, their structures, their unique expressions of thought - and used them as fuel for a machine that now competes with them. Meta, in its defense, likely appeals to necessity, to progress, or to the nature of learning itself. But moral philosophy does not care for the efficiency of the machine; it cares for the dignity of the agent.
If we universalise the maxim that one may use the creative output of another as a raw material for one’s own commercial enterprise without permission, we encounter an immediate logical contradiction. Imagine a world in which every author, every publisher, every creator of content operates under this rule. In such a world, no one would publish. Why would an author spend years crafting a novel if any corporation could simply ingest it, replicate its style, and produce a derivative work without compensation or attribution? The institution of copyright, and indeed the very concept of intellectual property, would cease to exist. The maxim destroys the condition of its own possibility. One cannot will a universal law that abolishes the incentive for creation while simultaneously relying on the creations of others. It is a contradiction in conception. The system collapses under its own weight.
we must apply the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative: treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end. What is Meta doing here? It is treating the authors and publishers as mere means. Their works are not respected as expressions of rational agency; they are reduced to data points, to inputs in a statistical model. The authors are not engaged as partners in a dialogue; they are mined. To use a person’s labor without their consent is to deny their autonomy. It is to say that their will is irrelevant compared to the efficiency of the algorithm. This is not merely a legal dispute; it is a violation of the moral law. The authors are being instrumentalised. Their dignity is being traded for computational power.
One might argue that this is a necessary evil for the advancement of artificial intelligence. That the benefits to society outweigh the harms to the few. But this is the error of consequentialism. It asks, “What good will come of this?” rather than “Is this right?” If we allow the ends to justify the means, we open the door to every tyranny. The tyrant also argues that his actions produce order, or security, or prosperity. The moral law is not a calculation of utility; it is a boundary that cannot be crossed. If we cross it once for the sake of progress, we have no ground to stand on when we are crossed in turn.
The stakes here are not merely financial. They are foundational. If we accept that intellectual property is optional when the taker is powerful enough, we undermine the very notion of rights. Rights are not privileges granted by the strong; they are claims that rational beings make against one another. To ignore them is to deny the rationality of the other. Meta’s action suggests that the law is a suggestion, applicable only when it is convenient. This is not a legal strategy; it is a moral failure. It reveals a worldview in which principle is subordinate to power.
The duty that follows from this analysis is clear. Meta must cease the unauthorized use of copyrighted materials. It must seek consent, or compensate fairly, or refrain from using the works altogether. There is no middle ground. To continue is to act on a maxim that cannot be universalised and that treats persons as means. The lawsuit is not merely a battle for revenue; it is a defense of the moral order. It is a demand that the new technology respect the old laws of human dignity. We must not let the speed of innovation outpace the slowness of principle. For if we do, we will find ourselves in a world where nothing is owned, nothing is respected, and nothing is truly human. The machine may learn, but it must not steal. That is the line.