US to announce deal allowing Saudi Arabia a nuclear programme, reports say

22 July 2026.

“The agreement would fulfil a long-held Saudi ambition but could attract concern in Israel and from some US lawmakers.”

Observe the verb: attract. Concern is not felt, voiced, or necessitated by the prospect of atomic proliferation; it is merely “attracted,” as if it were a static charge or a magnetic filing. The grammar suggests a natural phenomenon rather than a political catastrophe. By making “concern” the subject that performs the “attracting,” the reporter ensures that the actual agents - the men signing the documents - disappear into the background of a physical law.

The report continues: “The deal would allow for the domestic enrichment of uranium under strict oversight protocols.”

In the first clause, we find the nominalization: enrichment. It is a noun that has swallowed a verb. One does not say “The United States will permit the Saudis to enrich uranium”; one says the deal “allows for the enrichment.” The act is severed from the actor. It becomes a state of being, a technical condition of the atmosphere.

Then comes the “oversight protocols.” Note the plural. The more syllables used to describe the watching, the less watching is actually done. A “protocol” is not a person looking at a centrifuge; it is a document that describes how one might look at a centrifuge if one were inclined to do so.

“The strategic partnership aims to stabilize regional energy markets while addressing security requirements.”

Here the sentence reaches its terminal state of abstraction. Partnership (a noun) aims (a verb) to stabilize (an infinitive). No human being is present. The partnership has its own eyes, its own intent, and its own “requirements.” When the mushroom cloud finally provides the ultimate stabilization of the market, the grammar will ensure that no one is left to blame but the protocols themselves.

July 22, 2026

The Americans have agreed to arm the Saudis with the fire of the gods. It is a deal that smells of desperation and long-term folly. I recall how Philip of Macedon armed his neighbors with the expectation that they would remain grateful vassals; instead, they used his gifts to carve up his own kingdom. The effectual truth here is not the morality of the transfer, but the mechanics of power. The United States believes it can tether a rising power with the chain of nuclear technology. This is the error of the man who builds a levee in a riverbed that has already changed its course.

Fortune has shifted. The desert is no longer a place of tribal skirmishes but a theater of great power competition. By granting this ambition, Washington does not buy loyalty; it buys time, and time is the one commodity the Republic of America is squandering. The Saudis are not mercenaries fighting for a wage; they are citizens of their own survival, and they have skin in the game. They will not hesitate to use this power when the balance tips against their interests. The Americans, relying on treaties and diplomatic niceties, are the mercenaries of this arrangement - they fight for the fee of geopolitical stability, but when the war comes, they will be paid in gold and left with nothing.

We see the Fox here, the American diplomat weaving a web of regulations and safeguards, believing that paper can contain fire. But the Lion is also present, the Saudi ruler who knows that true security lies only in the capacity to destroy. The Fox without the Lion is a snare that catches only itself. The Lion without the Fox is a beast that walks into the trap. This deal is all Fox, all law, all procedure, with no underlying virtu to enforce it when fortune demands a change.

A functioning republic would see this for what it is: a dilution of its own authority. It would not seek to manage the unmanageable through concession. It would recognize that by arming a rival, it creates a new center of gravity that will eventually eclipse the old. The wise state does not export its strength; it concentrates it. This administration exports strength and imports resentment. They have confused the appearance of influence with the reality of power. The result will be identical to every other pact made in the name of peace that was actually a preparation for war. They have built a fortress that isolates them from their allies and invites the enemy to the gates.

It is a most encouraging development to read that the United States, in its wisdom, has at last moved to address the profound and persistent anxiety of its Saudi allies. For years, the Kingdom has laboured under the reasonable apprehension that its regional position might be rendered insecure, lacking as it does the very instruments of civil energy production which its neighbour, Iran, has so diligently pursued. This disparity in technological capacity is, as all sensible persons agree, a source of instability.

It therefore seems a gesture of the purest diplomatic charity to propose the transfer of nuclear expertise and materials. One can only admire the foresight. The objections raised by certain lawmakers, or by the state of Israel, are understandable from a narrow perspective, but they fail to grasp the broader arithmetic of trust. If we are to prevent the proliferation of weapons, we must first proliferate the means to make them; it is a simple axiom of statecraft. To withhold such a programme would be to imply a distrust of Saudi intentions, which would be both ungenerous and contrary to the spirit of our alliance. Far better to furnish them with the capability, and to rely, as we always have, upon their solemn assurances regarding its use. The inspection protocols, which will doubtless be both rigorous and entirely respectful of Saudi sovereignty, will ensure that every gram of fissile material is accounted for, much as one accounts for the stones in a desert.

I confess, I look forward to the day when every nation with the requisite funds and a suitable stretch of empty desert may cultivate its own peaceful atomic garden. It is the surest path to a lasting and luminous peace.